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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
Plaintiff-Respondent,
)
)
v.
)
)
MIGUEL MARQUEZ,
)
)
Defendant-Appellant.
)
___________________________)

NO. 44254
MINIDOKA COUNTY NO. CR 2015-648
APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Miguel Marquez contends the district court abused its discretion when it
relinquished jurisdiction in his case.

He asserts a sufficient consideration all the

mitigating factors in the record reveals a period of probation would better serve all the
goals of sentencing.

As such, this Court should reverse the order relinquishing

jurisdiction and remand this case so that Mr. Marquez can be placed on probation.
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Marquez pled guilty to possession of
methamphetamine, and the State originally agreed to recommend a unified sentence of
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five years, with two years fixed, which would be suspended for a period of probation
while Mr. Marquez participated in the drug court program. (Tr., p.5, L.19 - p.6, L.2;
R., pp.39-41.)

Alternatively, if drug court were not an option, the State agreed to

recommend a period of retained jurisdiction. (Tr., p.6, Ls.2-4.) Mr. Marquez was not
accepted into drug court because he had another pending case in Lincoln County.
(R., p.59.) He subsequently applied for mental health court, but that application was
denied after Mr. Marquez missed his assessment interview. (R., pp.66-68, 78.)
Around that same time, Mr. Marquez had a confrontation with officers, in which it
appeared he was attempting “suicide by police officer.”1 (Tr., p.13, Ls.11-20; p.28,
Ls.22-24.)

As a result, defense counsel requested the district court order a

psychological evaluation in anticipation of sentencing, which the district court did.
(Tr., p.13, L.18 - p.14, L.10; R., pp.89-90.) That evaluation determined “substance use
is Mr. Marquez’s primary problem with respect to his adaptive functioning across
multiple domains.”

(Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI), p.125.)

However, it also diagnosed Mr. Marquez with major depressive disorder, and gave a
rule-out diagnosis for antisocial personality disorder. (PSI, p.124.)
At sentencing, the district court clarified that Mr. Marquez had been acquitted in
the Lincoln County case. (Tr., p.23, Ls.7-12.) That meant, as defense counsel pointed
out, the instant offense was Mr. Marquez’s first felony conviction.

(Tr., p.28, L.8.)

Nevertheless, defense counsel acknowledged probation was not appropriate at that
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According to defense counsel, that incident resulted in a separate case in which
Mr. Marquez was charged with several misdemeanors, and that Mr. Marquez
anticipated resolving that case with sentences ordered to be served concurrent with his
sentence in this case. (See Tr., p.29, Ls.2-4.) That other case is not included in this
appeal. (See, e.g., R., pp.123-24.)
2

particular point in time and recommended the district court retain jurisdiction instead.
(Tr., p.10, Ls.10-20, p.29, Ls.14-23.) The State also, and without objection, departed
from the plea agreement, recommending the district court impose and execute a unified
sentence of seven years, with two years fixed. (Tr., p.21, L.22 - p.22, L.13.) The district
court acknowledged Mr. Marquez’s young age (25 years old (PSI, p.1)), and his
rehabilitative potential. (Tr., p.32, Ls.1-25.) However, it concluded there were too many
coinciding issues to justify probation at that time. (Tr., p.31, Ls.17-23.) As such, it
imposed a unified sentence of seven years, with two years fixed, and retained
jurisdiction. (Tr., p.35, Ls.9-13; R., pp.96-99.)
According to the program staff, Mr. Marquez struggled to engage fully in the
classes during his period of retained jurisdiction. (PSI, p.116.) He also received two
formal disciplinary reports and two other informal sanctions. (PSI, pp.112-13.) The
district court ultimately relinquished jurisdiction without a hearing.

(R., pp.111-13.)

Thereafter, Mr. Marquez filed a motion requesting the district court reconsider its
decision to relinquish jurisdiction, and he requested a hearing so that he could explain
what happened during his rider program. (R., p.115.) A letter he wrote to defense
counsel was attached to that motion, and in that letter, Mr. Marquez pointed out that he
had taken responsibility for the conduct which led to his disciplinary sanctions, and he
explained that he had been learning pro-social skills while in the rider program and he
had been applying them in his daily life. (R., pp.117-18.) Still, the district court denied
that motion to reconsider without a hearing. (R., pp.120-21.) Mr. Marquez then filed a
notice of appeal which was timely from the order relinquishing jurisdiction.
(R., pp.111, 123.)
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ISSUE
Whether the district court abused its discretion by relinquishing jurisdiction over
Mr. Marquez.
ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Relinquishing Jurisdiction Over Mr. Marquez
The district court’s decision to relinquish jurisdiction is reviewed under an abuse
of discretion standard. State v. Statton, 136 Idaho 135, 137 (2001); State v. Hurst, 151
Idaho 430, 438 (Ct. App. 2011). Such a decision will not be considered an abuse of
discretion “if the trial court has sufficient information to determine that a suspended
sentence and probation would be inappropriate.” State v. Merwin, 131 Idaho 642, 648
(1998). “The purpose of retaining jurisdiction after imposing a sentence is to afford the
trial court additional time for evaluation of the defendant’s rehabilitation potential and
suitability for probation.” State v. Lee, 117 Idaho 203, 205 (Ct. App. 1990). In making
that determination, the district court “considers all of the circumstances to assess the
defendant’s ability to succeed in a less structured environment and to determine the
course of action that will further the purposes of rehabilitation, protection of society,
deterrence, and retribution.” Statton, 136 Idaho at 137. In this regard, the need to
protect society is the primary objective the court should consider. See, e.g., State v.
Charboneau, 124 Idaho 497, 500 (1993). However, the Idaho Supreme Court has also
held that rehabilitation “should usually be the initial consideration in the imposition of the
criminal sanction.” State v. McCoy, 94 Idaho 236, 240 (1971), superseded on other
grounds as stated in State v. Theil, 158 Idaho 103 (2015).
In this case, it is important to remember that the parties initially agreed that a
period of probation was an appropriate sentence for this case. (Tr., p.5, L.19 - p.6, L.2;
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R., pp.39-41.) The reason for that was the parties agreed the drug court would provide
the best treatment for Mr. Marquez (i.e., it would provide the best opportunity for
rehabilitation and long-term protection of society). (See Tr., p.5, L.19 - p.6, L.2.) That
was an appropriate conclusion because, as the psychological evaluation would later
make clear, it is Mr. Marquez’s substance abuse issues that are the primary issue which
needs to be addressed in this rehabilitative efforts. (PSI, p.125.) It is also important to
recognize that the reason he was denied the opportunity to participate in that program is
that he was dealing with another pending case, and he was ultimately acquitted in that
other case. (R., p.59; Tr., p.23, Ls.7-12.) Thus, in looking at Mr. Marquez’s actions and
his immediate needs surrounding them, probation was the appropriate sentence.
See, e.g., State v. Findeisen, 133 Idaho 228, 229-30 (Ct. App. 1999) (explaining that,
while the district court can consider a wide range of information in sentencing, its focus
should be on addressing the acts in the case before it).
With that starting point, Mr. Marquez acknowledges there were other factors
which were properly considered at the initial sentencing hearing and which indicated
that probation was not appropriate at that time.
Ls.14-23.)

(See Tr., p.10, Ls.10-20, p.29,

It is also true that he struggled at times during his period of retained

jurisdiction. (PSI, pp.112-13, 116.) However, as the letter attached to Mr. Marquez’s
motion to reconsider relinquishing jurisdiction reveals, he was trying to make progress in
learning pro-social lessons during the rider program. (R., p.117.) Since rehabilitation is
a process, while he may not have always been successful in his efforts toward that goal,
the fact that he was making those efforts merits consideration.
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For example, he accepted responsibility for his inappropriate behaviors in the
rider program. (R., p.117; see PSI, pp.112-13.) Acceptance of responsibility is a critical
first step toward rehabilitation. See State v. Kellis, 148 Idaho 812, 815 (Ct. App. 2010).
That he has taken those first steps is important because he is still young (PSI, p.25),
and this is also his first felony conviction (Tr., p.28, L.8), both of which indicate leniency
in sentencing is appropriate as both highlight his potential to successfully rehabilitate.
See, e.g., State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 595 (1982). Mr. Marquez also has the
support of his family. (PSI, p.10.) For example, his father offered Mr. Marquez a place
to stay on probation, as well as assistance in getting to drug court classes or Narcotics
Anonymous meetings. (PSI, p.10.) Family constitutes an important part of a support
network, which also makes successful rehabilitation more likely. See Kellis, 148 Idaho
at 817.

Successful rehabilitation is important since, by addressing the underlying

issues, society is better protected in the long term.
Therefore, an adequate consideration of all the mitigating factors in this record,
particularly in light of the initial recommendations in this case, reveals that, despite his
struggles in the rider program, probation was still the sentencing option which best
served all the goals of sentencing in Mr. Marquez’s case. As such, the district court
abused its discretion by relinquishing jurisdiction over Mr. Marquez.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Marquez respectfully requests that this Court reverse the order relinquishing
jurisdiction and remand this case so he may be released on probation.
DATED this 27th day of October, 2016.
______/S/___________________
BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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